Understanding the sense of self and bodily awareness is a central issue in cognitive neuroscience and psychology. A growing body of research suggests that interoception—the brain’s ability to sense, interpret, and integrate internal bodily signals—plays a vital role in our experience of being embodied and in maintaining a stable, continuous sense of self across time (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012; Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014). Interoception refers to the physiological process through which the nervous system provides a moment-by-moment mapping of internal states such as heart rate, respiration, hunger, and pain, operating at both conscious and unconscious levels (Baiano et al., 2021; Khalsa et al., 2018).
These internal bodily cues are not only essential for maintaining homeostasis, but are also closely tied to self-awareness and subjective experience (Candia-Rivera et al., 2024). Neuroanatomical studies support the existence of an “interoceptive neural network,” involving brain regions such as the somatosensory and motor cortices, the insula, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and both the ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, all of which contribute to the processing of interoceptive signals (Herbert & Pollatos, 2012).
At the heart of this idea is embodiment—the belief that our thinking is closely linked to our body and actions. Embodiment emphasizes that the body is not just a vessel for the mind but is deeply involved in shaping our perceptions, emotions, and identity (Candia-Rivera et al., 2024). Longo and his colleagues (Longo et al., 2008) further explain this idea through a multidimensional model of embodiment, which contains critical aspects such as body ownership, agency, tactile sensation, and self-location—dimensions directly influenced by interoceptive processing.
This paper explores how interoceptive processing contributes to the sense of body ownership—the feeling that one’s body belongs to oneself—as well as its role in maintaining the stability of the self over time. Specifically, it examines how internal bodily cues support the coherence and continuity of selfhood, holding it within a dynamic yet embodied space. While the brain’s representation of the body is known to be highly plastic and adaptable, as demonstrated by experiments such as the rubber hand illusion and virtual body substitution (Banakou & Slater, 2014) interoception may serve as a more stable internal anchor that helps maintain a consistent bodily self despite moving external sensory inputs (Craig, 2002; Tsakiris, 2017). Craig emphasizes that interoceptive signals generate a foundational sense of bodily presence from within, providing continuity even when external body representations are variable. Tsakiris (2017) similarly argues that individuals with greater interoceptive accuracy are more resistant to body illusions, further supporting the role of interoception as a stabilizing mechanism.
By critically examining how interoceptive and multisensory integration inform body ownership and identity, this paper argues that interoception forms a foundational layer in the construction and maintenance of the self—physically, cognitively, and emotionally.
Interoception and Body Ownership
The sense of body ownership refers to the subjective experience that one’s body, or a specific body part, belongs to oneself (Gallagher, S., 2000). This essential component of self-awareness arises from the integration of multiple sensory modalities, including visual, tactile, proprioceptive, and interoceptive inputs (Craig, 2002; Tsakiris, 2017). While exteroceptive cues—such as seeing one’s limbs or feeling external touch—play a role in constructing body awareness, they are often unstable and influenced by environmental changes. In contrast, interoceptive signals—such as heartbeat and visceral sensations—offer a continuous internal stream of information, contributing to a more consistent and enduring sense of the bodily self.
Based on both foundational and recent findings, interoceptive accuracy appears to play a critical role in stabilising body ownership. Individuals with heightened interoceptive sensitivity tend to be less influenced by body illusions that rely on manipulated external sensory cues, highlighting the grounding effect of internal bodily signals (Tsakiris, 2017). Craig (2002) describes interoception as creating a reliable “inside-out” model of the self, while Seth (2013) argues that interoceptive inference underlies affective and perceptual stability—making it a foundational mechanism of selfhood (Seth, 2013).
One of the most powerful demonstrations of the flexibility of body ownership is found in the Rubber Hand Illusion (RHI). In this paradigm, participants can begin to feel that a rubber hand is their own when their hidden real hand and the visible rubber hand are stroked in synchrony (Botvinick & Cohen, 1998). The RHI shows how multisensory integration can alter body representation, particularly through synchronised visual and tactile input dominating or overpowering proprioceptive information (Ehrsson et al., 2004; Tsakiris & Haggard, 2005). However, not all individuals are equally affected to this illusion. Those with greater interoceptive sensitivity—such as accurate heartbeat perception—are generally less likely to experience the RHI, indicating that interoception may guard against misleading exteroceptive cues (Tsakiris et al., 2011).
In addition to interoceptive sensitivity, trait-level differences in embodiment have been shown to shape vulnerability to body illusions. Longo et al. (2008) proposed a psychometric framework that includes distinct dimensions such as ownership, agency, tactile sensation, and spatial location. These embodiment traits vary between individuals and help explain why some people are more resistant to altered body representations. Such findings support the idea that the subjective sense of body ownership depends not only on moment-to-moment sensory integration but also on stable traits related to how the body is internally monitored and represented.
Further supporting this view, Herbert and Pollatos (2012) found that individuals with high interoceptive sensitivity are significantly less affected by the RHI. This reinforces the idea that internal bodily awareness acts as a stabilising force, protecting against changes in body representation during conflicting multisensory input. Traits such as proprioceptive acuity and general body awareness have similarly been associated with decreased susceptibility to body ownership illusions (Longo et al., 2008).
Beyond laboratory-based illusions, Banakou and Slater (2014) demonstrated that immersive virtual reality (VR) experiences can manipulate body representation in ways that influence not only physiological responses but also implicit social attitudes—for example, by reducing racial bias. These findings highlight the plasticity of body ownership when exposed to altered multisensory environments. Yet, they also reinforce the stabilising influence of interoception: a consistent internal anchor that safeguards against excessive flexibility and maintains coherence in bodily self-awareness.
Peripersonal Space and Self-Location
Peripersonal space (PPS)—the immediate area surrounding the body—is more than a guard zone for sensory-motor interactions; it plays a vital role in the subjective experience of embodiment and self-location. It represents the space in which objects can be directly acted upon or interacted with and is crucial for the brain’s mapping of the body in relation to the environment (Serino, 2019). Importantly, PPS is not rigidly defined by anatomical boundaries; it is dynamic and shaped by sensory input, attention, and bodily states.
Research by Noel et al. (Noel et al., 2015) demonstrates that PPS is centred not merely on the physical body but on the perceived location of the self, which can shift under different sensory or bodily conditions. This dynamic aspect of PPS becomes especially relevant in illusions such as virtual body swaps, where individuals can experience shifts in perceived self-location—often explained by altered multisensory integration.
Interoception plays a stabilizing role in these processes by holding the self internally, even when exteroceptive signals are manipulated or misleading. The integration of interoceptive and exteroceptive inputs within PPS provides a framework in which the body is not only “owned” but also “located” in space. In this way, PPS serves as a bridge between internal bodily awareness and external spatial representation, with interoception helping to maintain a consistent sense of presence and self-boundary (Blanke et al., 2015).
Furthermore, fluctuations in PPS have been linked to emotional states and bodily threat perception, further supporting its integration with internal bodily cues (Ferri et al., 2015). For example, PPS expands when individuals feel anxious or under threat, suggesting that interoceptive signals related to arousal modulate the brain’s mapping of near-body space. This reinforces the idea that PPS is not simply spatial but is intimately tied to bodily self-awareness and affective regulation—both key dimensions of self-stability.
Interoception and the Stability of the Self
Craig (2010) discussed how interoceptive processing forms the basis for the continuity of the self, tying physiological signals to the experience of being a sentient, unified individual. He emphasized that interoception generates a unified sense of self that persists over time, grounded not just in cognition but in bodily awareness. Beyond the domain of body ownership, interoception contributes directly to a stable and enduring sense of self by supporting the continuous perception of coherence, agency, and internal consistency. This perspective is further supported by Seth (2013), who proposed the model of interoceptive inference, in which the brain constantly predicts and updates information about the body’s internal state. According to this framework, the stable sense of self is not constructed solely from higher-order cognitive or narrative components, but emerges from the dynamic, moment-by-moment interpretation of internal bodily signals. Similarly, Damasio (1999) has argued that the feeling of what happens—the core of subjective consciousness—is rooted in the brain’s ongoing mapping of interoceptive cues.
Theories of embodiment reinforce this fundamental connection between internal bodily signals and psychological selfhood. Ferrari & Coudé, (2018) suggest that cognition cannot be understood in isolation from the body, arguing that experiences such as perception, memory, and emotion are deeply grounded in physical, embodied experience. Interoception, in this framework, acts as an internal stream that links the physiological and psychological dimensions of the self. This view is echoed by Tsakiris & Critchley (2016), who describe interoceptive signals—especially those related to the viscera—as foundational in constructing self-relevant cognitive content, and in mediating affective and perceptual stability.
Park & Tallon-Baudry (2014) extend this understanding by introducing the concept of the neural subjective frame. They argue that the brain uses interoceptive signals, particularly ascending inputs from the heart, to build a self-centred reference system that tags incoming information as self-related. They also state that these signals not only orient the self in the present moment but help preserve a stable and coherent identity even when the external environment is unstable or ambiguous. This internal consistency is essential to maintaining psychological stability and plays a crucial role in enabling the individual to locate themselves in space and time (Park & Tallon-Baudry, 2014).
Importantly, disruptions in interoception have been linked to a range of psychopathologies characterized by a fragmented or unstable sense of self. Blanke & Metzinger (2009) argue that when interoceptive processing becomes unreliable, individuals may experience depersonalization or disembodiment—phenomena where the body feels foreign or disconnected from the self. Sierra & Berrios (1998) also observed that altered interoceptive awareness is a defining feature of depersonalization disorder, reinforcing the idea that interoception is central to self-coherence and affective integration. As Baumeister (1999) clearly put it, “… self starts with a body,” and this idea is substantiated by research from Noel et al. (2015), who demonstrated that bodily self-location depends on both exteroceptive and interoceptive signals. Their findings highlight that selfhood emerges from being knowingly situated within one’s physical body, and that interoception plays an essential role in anchoring this embodied self.
Taken together, these findings emphasize the essential contribution of interoception to the stability of the self. It not only supports the continuous experience of being a unified and agentive individual but also helps shield the self from fragmentation during emotionally or cognitively demanding situations (Seth, 2013). This supports with Damasio (1999) theory that the continuity of selfhood is grounded in the ongoing perception of internal bodily states. Interoceptive signals do more than track what is happening inside our bodies—they help build the foundation of our conscious sense of self.
The Cognitive Role of Interoceptive Integration
Recent studies have shown that interoception also plays a significant role in higher-order cognitive functions, particularly in relation to perception, decision-making, and emotion. Azzalini et al. (2019) and Candia-Rivera et al. (2024) have demonstrated how visceral signals, especially from the heart, modulate brain dynamics and subjective experiences. For example, Park & Tallon-Baudry (2014) found that the timing of neural responses to heartbeats can predict how visual stimuli are consciously perceived, suggesting a direct link between cardiac signals and perceptual awareness.
Such findings support the theory that interoception influences exteroceptive perception by modulating attentional and emotional importance. This has practical implications for understanding emotional regulation and decision-making processes. Critchley & Garfinkel (2018) argue that the accuracy and awareness of interoceptive signals are strongly correlated with emotional intelligence and adaptive behaviour. Therefore, disruptions in interoceptive accuracy can lead to poor self-regulation, heightened anxiety, and reduced emotional insight.
Another important concept is the shift from homeostasis to allostasis in understanding bodily regulation. While homeostasis refers to the maintenance of internal stability, allostasis emphasizes the body’s capacity to adapt to changing environmental and internal demands (Kleckner et al., 2017). Interoceptive mechanisms, therefore, are not static but dynamic, enabling the self to maintain coherence despite continual flux. This adaptive capacity is key to understanding how the embodied self maintains its stability even in the face of stress, trauma, or environmental uncertainty.
Conclusion
Interoception appears to play an important and multifaceted role in shaping both the sense of body ownership and the stability of the self. It offers an internal foundation that helps bring together bodily signals into a steady sense of being—a self that feels continuous, located in space, and able to act. Although external stimuli and illusions can change how body ownership and self-location are experienced, interoceptive processes seem to offer a balancing effect. These internal signals contribute not only to bodily awareness but also to functions like emotional regulation, perception, and decision-making.
In addition, peripersonal space—often thought of as the space immediately surrounding the body—can be seen as a flexible area where the body meets the external world. This space is shaped by both internal and external sensory input. Its adaptability shows how the brain can adjust to different situations, while interoception may help provide a steady sense of self by keeping internal reference points stable.
Research from both theory and experiments suggests that the self is not only shaped by thought but also by how the body is experienced from within. When interoception is disrupted, people may feel less connected to their body or identity, which is often seen in some clinical conditions. This highlights how important interoception may be for mental and emotional balance.
To sum up, interoception should not be seen as just a background bodily function, but as something central to how we experience ourselves. As more studies explore its role, we may discover useful ways to improve well-being through better understanding and support of interoceptive processes. Recognising the body’s role in shaping selfhood can help us build more complete models of how identity and consciousness work in everyday life.
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